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The firm is an ongoing joint project requiring both financial and human 
capital. Like other joint projects, the firm cannot maximize added value without 
achieving an efficient incentive bargain among the indispensable capital 
providers, i.e., shareholders and creditors as the monetary capital providers, 
and management and employees as the human capital providers. To stimulate 
efficient incentive bargaining at the firm level and, consequently, to enhance the 
efficiency of the whole economy, I will propose a new concept, the “enterprise 
law,” and define it as any law which will affect the incentive bargaining of the 
firm. We will draw the whole picture of incentive bargaining at the firm by 
focusing on the interrelationships and complementarities among contracts, 
markets, and laws; thereafter we will present some legislative policy 
implications. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The firm is a consecutive joint project among providers of indispensable capital, 
which includes both monetary capital and human capital, for the project. Like other 
joint projects, the firm cannot maximize the added value without achieving an efficient 
“incentive bargain”1 among those indispensable capital providers, i.e., shareholders 
and creditors as monetary capital providers, and management and employees as human 
capital providers.2 
 
Markets and laws are two basic infrastructures of the incentive bargain of the 
firm. Therefore, law matters for successful incentive bargaining among the four 
different capital providers. The important point is that law does not by itself affect the 
incentive bargain among those four players, but rather affects it interrelationally with 
markets. We can observe interrelationships among different markets, and 
interrelationships between law and contracts, too. 
 
Also a specific law, in many cases, would not affect the incentive bargain 
independently, but affects it complementarily with other laws. Law has traditionally 
been studied by dividing a legal system into its many substantive parts. Now, however, 
we must adopt a new perspective in order to study law as an infrastructural element of 
the firm’s incentive bargain. I will propose a new concept, the “enterprise law” and 
define it as any law which will affect the incentive bargain of the firm. To show the 
structure of the enterprise law, we need to not only gather different areas of law, such as 
corporate law, securities regulation, bankruptcy law, labor law, and tax law, but also 
analyze complementarities among different laws and interactions between law and 
markets. In other words, we cannot show you the structure of the enterprise law 
without drawing the whole picture of the incentive bargain of the firm, including 
interrelationships among different institutions. 
 
The object of this paper and the object of the proposal to reconstruct legal 
systems, which affect the incentive bargain of the firm, as the enterprise law, is to 
stimulate efficient incentive bargaining at the firm level, and consequently, to enhance 
                                                  
1  The incentive bargain is defined as the bargain among the indispensable capital providers 
of the firm, for motivating each other to provide the capital they own to the joint project, 
including the bargain for sharing control and the bargain for sharing cash-flow. 
2  Zenichi Shishido, Dokizuke no Shikumi toshiteno Kigyo: Insenthibu Shisutemu no 
Hoseido Ron [The Firm as an Incentive Mechanism: The Role of Legal Institution] 1 (2006).  3
the efficiency of the whole economy. 
 
It would be a big project to draw the complete picture of the enterprise law. In 
this stage, as a game plan, this paper will address four examples of different types of 
complementarities and interrelationships to provide the image of the whole structure of 
the incentive bargain of the firm and the enterprise law. In this paper, the model of the 
firm is a typical Japanese publicly held corporation in late 2000s, which has no 
controlling shareholder but stabilizes stock ownership by cross-shareholding. 
 
In Chapter II, I will introduce a framework to see the firm as an incentive 
mechanism among the four players by providing three basic “incentive patterns.” I also 
propose a concept of “enterprise law” as an important infrastructural element of the 
incentive bargain among the four players of the firm, and introduce five different types 
of interrelationships among different institutions. Chapter III will analyze the incentive 
of management and show you how different markets and laws interrelationally affect 
management’s incentive. Chapter IV will examine the risk taking of management and 
illustrate how contracts and laws interrelationally affect it. Chapter V will focus on the 
trend of shareholder activism and show you how different laws complementary 
stimulate shareholder activism while other laws complementary discourage 
shareholder activism. In Chapter VI, I will characterize the reaction of Japanese 
management against the shareholder activism movement since 2005 as the “alliance 
against genuine shareholders” by dividing it into the coalition between cross-holding 
shareholders and management, and the coalition between employees and management. 
I will illustrate the interrelationship between the two coalitions. Finally, Chapter VII 
will provide a conclusion and some legislative policy proposals for enhancing the 
efficiency of the firm’s incentive bargain.   
 
II. The Firm as an Incentive Mechanism 
 
A. The Incentive Bargain of the Firm 
 
  The firm can be understood as an incentive mechanism between those who 
provide human capital (management and employees) and those who provide monetary 
capital (shareholders and creditors). The human capital providers use the funds 
provided by the monetary capital providers and create value3.  According to the 
                                                  
3  Therefore, the human capital providers seek more autonomy and the monetary capital  4
contracts negotiated at the outset, the four groups of participants then share the 
returns that accrue to the firm.    Each of the four groups provides capital that is crucial 
to their collective enterprise.  Should one group hesitate to provide that capital, the 
enterprise will suffer.  Therefore, the groups use the firm structure to give each other 
incentives to invest in a way that maximizes the firm's value added and maximizes each 
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Those four players try to give incentives to each other through the bargaining 
over sharing cash-flow rights and sharing control. Such bargaining is always conducted 
via management, which functions as the sole bargaining window, although some 
coalition could be made among the 4 players. Therefore, there are three bargaining 
relationships in the firm: the bargaining relationship between shareholders and 
management; that between creditors and management; and that between employees 
and management [See Figure2]. As I will mention later, 4   we can observe 
interrelationships among those bargaining relationships. 
                                                                                                                                                  
providers want more monitoring power on how to use money. See id., at 38. 
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B. Three Incentive Patterns and Divergence of Internalized Governance 
 
The differences between the “functional corporate governance” practices of 
different countries 5 will be revealed as the differences in “incentive bargaining” 
                                                  
5  Interesting debates on convergence of corporate governance in the world have been made 
for the last decade (See Lucian Bebchuck & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); J. Mark Ramseyer, Are 
Corporate Governance Systems Converging? (Working Paper, 1998); Ronald Gilson, 
Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 
(2001); John Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence and 
Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1999); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The 
End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439 (2001)). Nowadays the participants in 
the debates realize that they should distinguish between the formal convergence of legal 
systems and the functional convergence of practices, and the prevailing view is that if formal 
convergence cannot be achieved, functional convergence will still occur (See Gilson, supra 
note 5, at 329; Coffee, supra note 5, at 641.). Two main topics of the functional convergence 
debate are the concentration of share ownership and the labor influence (See Bebchuck & 
Roe, supra note 5, at 127.).   
The “strong convergence” theses argue that world corporate governance will 
converge or already have converged to the A-model(See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 
5, at 439.). Contrary to the prediction and the recognition by those strong convergence 
theorists, however, “there is little sign that Japanese corporate governance practices are 
being fundamentally transformed or rapidly ‘converging’ with those of the United States” 
(See Curtis Milhaupt, The Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform?: What’s 
Changed, What Hasn’t , and Why (Working Paper 2003).). 
In the convergence of corporate governance debate, diversity of stock ownership is  6
practices among the four players in these countries, particular the way in which 
coalitions are constructed among the four players. We will call them “incentive 
patterns.” There are three different incentive patterns for publicly held companies.6  
 
Optimal internalized governance system, i.e., incentive patterns, will diverge 
depending upon exogenous factors: viz., markets (capital, labor, and product); social 
norms; and legal systems.7 There is also the possibility of the coexistence of multiple 
internalized governance systems in a single country, depending upon the industry 
sector and the growth stage of the company. Different degrees of significance of 
relation-specific investment in each industry sector will be particularly influential on 
the choice of optimal internalized governance system. 
 
1. Balancing Image 
 
The basic incentive pattern is the “balancing image,” in which, while there is no 
coalition among players, each player tries to pressure the management; as a 
consequence, the management will run the firm toward the direction of the sum of the 
vectors of pressure [See Figure 3]. That is the Berle & Means model.8  
                                                                                                                                                  
mostly argued as the criteria of functional convergence. However, the most fundamental 
aspect of functional corporate governance system, which can be chosen by the players under 
certain exogenous conditions, is how to motivate monetary capital providers and human 
capital providers to invest their own capital to the company. I will call the aspect “incentive 
pattern.” Diversity of stock ownership (and liquidity of stock market) is rather one of the 
exogenous factors, which restrict the choice of incentive pattern (See Zenichi Shishido, The 
Turnaround of 1997: Changes in Japanese Corporate Law and Governance, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 310, 323 
(Masahiko Aoki, et al. eds., 2007)).   
6  See Shishido, supra note 2, at 169. 
7  Legal systems, here, do not indicate jurisdictional bodies of law, but indicate bodies of 
substantive laws. 
8  See ADOLF A. BERLE GERDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
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2. Monitoring Image 
 
The second incentive pattern is the “monitoring image,” in which shareholders, 
as the owners, monitor their agent, the management, to run the firm only in their best 
interests, while the other players, creditors and employees, should be motivated 
through markets and should not be involved in corporate governance [See Figure 4]. 
That is the A-model.9  
                                                  
9  See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 69 (1991); Jonathan R. 
Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the 
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991); 
Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540, 550 
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3. Bargaining Image 
 
The third incentive pattern is the “bargaining image,” in which monetary 
capital providers and human capital providers organize their teams, and these two 
teams bargain with each other to motivate each other to invest their respective 
monetary and human capital [See Figure 5]. That is the J-model.10 
                                                  
10  See Tetsuji Okazaki, Nihon niokeru Kohporehto Gabanansu no Hatten [The Development 
of Corporate Governance in Japan], in SHISUTEMU TOSHITENO NIHON KIGYO [JAPANESE 
ENTERPRISES AS A SYSTEM] 456 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore eds.,1995); Zenichi Shishido, 
Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: Current Changes in 
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C. Enterprise Law 
 
  The legal system is an important infrastructural element of the firm’s incentive 
bargain. That part of the legal system that affects the bargaining among the 
participants in the firm we call “enterprise law.”    This enterprise law specifically 
includes corporate law, securities regulation, bankruptcy law, labor law, tax law, and 
others (intellectual property law, antitrust law, etc.). 
 
The enterprise law affects bargaining among the four players in three ways. 
First, it may directly affect the incentive of a specific player. Second, it may affect the 
relative bargaining power of some two players and consequently increase or decrease 
the risk borne by each player. And third, it may affect the coalition between some two 
players [See Figure 6].11 
                                                  
11  On coalition, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as 
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A part of the enterprise law works, in most cases, interrelationally with other 
parts of the enterprise law, including enforcement systems.       
 
D. The Role of the Government 
 
In addition the four players, the government also provides crucial 
infrastructural services (like the legal system and the courts), and through the tax 
regime acquires an interest in the returns to the firm's activities. Therefore, we could 
also consider including government as the fifth participant in the firm’s bargaining 
structure. In this analysis, however, we will not take the government as the fifth player 
of this game, but we treat taxation and regulations, which are provided by the 
government, as a given infrastructural component of the incentive bargain among the 
four players. 
  11
Usually, the government exercises its influence over the incentive bargain 
among the four players through the corporate personality of the firm, either through 
taxation or industrial regulation. Sometimes, however, governmental regulations 
directly address a specific player. The latter mode of regulation strongly impacts the 
incentive bargaining among the four players, although even the former mode of 
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E. Categories of Each Player and Relevant Markets 
 
Although we already categorized indispensable capital providers of the firm 
into four players, i.e., management, employees, shareholders, and creditors, we need to 
further divide each player into two sub-categories, at least for analyzing the effects of 
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Specifically, management can be divided into executives, particularly CEO, and 
monitors, such as independent directors and independent auditors. The incentive of the 
executive will be influenced by the executive market and the incentive of the monitor 
will be influenced by the monitor market. 
 
Employees can be divided into core employees and non-core employees. The 
labor market, which influences the incentives of employees, can also be divided into the 
labor market for core employees and that for non-core employees. 
 
Creditors can be separated into banks and business creditors, typically 
suppliers. The credit market will influence the incentive of both banks and business 
creditors. The incentive of the business creditor will also be influenced by the product 
market. 
 
Shareholders can be separated into genuine shareholders and business 
shareholders. The stock market will influence the incentive of both genuine 
shareholders and business shareholders. The incentive of the business shareholder will 
also be influenced by the product market. Both types of shareholders create the control 
market, which influences the incentives of both types of shareholders.    13
 
F. Five Different Types of Interrelationships 
 
In this paper, interrelationships exist when the coexistence or conjunction of 
two or more specific institutions, either gives the incentive of the players stronger 
effects, or counteracts their effects on the incentive of the players. 
 
We can observe five different types of interrelationships, which are important 
to understand the structure of the incentive bargain among the four players of the firm. 
 
1. Interrelationships among Different Markets12 
 
2. Interrelationships between Law and Markets13 
 
3. Interrelationships between Law and Contracts14 
 
4. Interrelationships among Different Laws15 
 
5. Interrelationships among different bargaining relationships16 
 
  Among the notion of interrelationship, we will try to identify the notion of 
complementarity. As definition, complementarity exists between the two variables when 
the marginal returns to one variable are increasing in the level of the other variables. In 
other words, we can identify “two policies or inputs or activities as complementary 
precisely when doing (more of) one raises the return to doing (more of) the other.” 17 
                                                  
12  See e.g., plural markets influence management’s reputation and her incentive (See 
Chapter III). 
13  See e.g., antitrust regulations and product market & disclosure regulations and stock 
market (See Chapter III, Sub-chapter B). 
14  See e.g., covenants and management responsibility rules on the risk taking of 
management (See Chapter IV, Sub-chapter B). 
15  See e.g., minority information rights and the shareholder derivative action on 
shareholder activism (See Chapter V). 
16  See e.g., risk taking of management and the interaction between the 
shareholder-management bargaining relationships and the creditor-management 
bargaining relationship (See Chapter IV); alliance against genuine shareholders and the 
interaction among the three bargaining relationships (See Chapter VI). 
17  Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure, and 
Organizational Change in Manufacturing, 19 J. ACC. ECON. 179, 181, 199 (1995). Professor 
Deeg divides complementarities to two forms: complementarity in the form of  14
 
III. The Incentive of Management and Evaluation by Markets: Interrelationships 
among Different Markets & Interrelationships between Law and Market 
 
When we see the firm as an incentive mechanism, the most important question 
is what is the incentive of management, particularly, the CEO, who has the authority to 
run the firm.   
 
We could hypothesize that a CEO will manage the firm for maximizing her own 
reputation as an executive because it will lead to maximizing both her long-term payoff 
and her psychological satisfaction.   
 
An executive’s reputation is evaluated by the executive market. How the 
executive market will evaluate a CEO is a complicated question. First, the executive 
market can be divided between the external market and the internal market. The latter 
is more important than the former in Japan and such a characteristic of the executive 
market inevitably influences the incentive of Japanese CEOs and consequently affects 
the incentive bargain of the firm. Second, the evaluation by the executive market is a 
mixture of the social evaluation, the evaluation by the product market, and the 
evaluation by the stock market. Here, we can observe interrelationships among 
different markets.   
 
A. Interrelationships among Executive Market, Product Market, and Stock Market 
 
Most CEOs care a lot about their social evaluation, which is not necessarily 
related to their evaluations by the product market and the stock market. The incentive 
to increase their social evaluation may lead to a good result for other players, for 
example, the CEO may try to keep good compliance because she does not like to lose 
opportunities to obtain chairperson’s positions of business associations due to possible 
scandals. On the other hand, it may lead to bad results for other players, for example, a 
CEO who frequently appears in the media (“super star CEO”) may use her time and 
energy not for her own firm but for social events.18 
                                                                                                                                                  
supplementarity in which one institution makes up for the deficiencies of the other 
(decreasing negative effect); and complementarity in the form of synergy (increasing positive 
effect). See Richard Deeg, Complementarity and Institutional Change: How Useful a 
Concept? 3 (Working Paper 2005). 
18  See Urlike Malmendier & Geoffrey A. Tate, Superstar CEOs (Working Paper 2008).  15
 
Although such a social evaluation is an important part of the evaluation by the 
executive market, the evaluation by the product market and that by the stock market 
constitute major parts of the evaluation by the executive market. If a CEO pays more 
attention to the evaluation by the product market and that by the stock market, her 
actions will likely produce better results for other players. Law can influence executive 
incentives to lead towards the optimal direction. 
 
B. Interrelationships between Laws and Markets 
 
Generally speaking, CEOs have an incentive to avoid competition in product 
markets, which is hard for them. Therefore, antitrust law, particularly, the cartel 
regulation, is necessary to maintain efficient product markets. Because of antitrust 
regulations, CEOs cannot avoid severe competition in product markets, and therefore 
they will have an incentive to motivate employees to win the competition. 
 
Disclosure regulations could increase the sensitivity of stock markets. More 
efficient stock markets may affect the CEO’s priorities among competing incentives. The 
evaluation by the stock market may become more important than the social evaluation 
because of the improvement of the stock market. It may also influence the practice of 
























    F i g u r e   9  
 
IV. Risk Taking of Management: Interrelationships among Contracts and Laws 
 
A. The Interrelationship between the Shareholder-Management Bargaining 
Relationship and the Creditor-Management Bargaining Relationship 
 
The risk taking of management is very relevant to the incentives of the other 
three players in the incentive bargain, particularly, shareholders and creditors. There 
are conflicting interests between shareholders and creditors, although they share the 
same interest as monetary capital providers. Shareholders have an incentive to gamble 
on the risk of creditors because shareholders can obtain all the upside-gain while they 
are protected against downside loss by limited liability. Therefore, creditors have an 
incentive to push CEOs to adopt a risk averse management policy, while shareholders 
have an incentive to push CEOs to adopt a risk neutral management policy in an 
o r d i n a r y  t i m e ,  a n d  e v e n  r i s k  l o v i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  p o l i c y  w h e n  t h e  f i r m  i s  a l m o s t  
insolvent. Management, particularly the CEO, is in a position of balancing such a 
conflict of interests. Here, we can observe an interrelationship between the two 
bargaining relationships. 
 
B. Interrelationships among Contracts and Laws  17
 
Several contracts and laws interrelationally affect the risk taking of 
management.  
 
Creditors, particularly banks and bond holders, who feel the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by shareholders and management, often try to insert covenants 
to lending contracts for preventing management from taking too much risk, such as, 
restrictions on providing collaterals, requirements for maintaining a certain level of 
profitability, requirements for retaining certain amounts of equity or certain equity 
ratios, restrictions on dividends, etc.19 
 
Besides such contracts, several different laws lead management to take less 
risk.  
 
Comparatively, Japanese corporate law has stricter dividend restriction than 
most jurisdictions in the United States. Japanese corporate law also has a unique 
statute providing for director responsibility to third parties, who are mostly creditors.20 
Japanese management risks personal liability to creditors in cases of corporate 
bankruptcy. Japanese bankruptcy law has procedural statutes to enforce management 
liability.21 The structure of shareholder derivative actions will also affect the risk 
preference of management. Japanese corporate law has no system of letting courts 
respect a board decision against a shareholder derivative action,22  and restricts capping 
damage amounts.23 Those Japanese laws will lead management to take less risk, 
relative to American laws. 
 
On the other hand, in Japan, shareholders can propose for the firm to pay more 
                                                  
19  See KENJIRO EGASHIRA, KABUSHIKIGAISHA HO (LAWS OF STOCK CORPORATIONS) 652 (2d 
ed., 2008).   
20  Corporate Law Section 429. 
21  Bankruptcy Law Sections 177; 178. 
22  In the United States, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Sections 7.08; 7.09; 7.10 (1992). 
23  Ex ante limitation, up to two times one’s annual remuneration, could be put only on 
outside directors. Limitation of liability of inside directors, up to six times of one’s annual 
remuneration in case of representative directors and up to four times of one’s annual 
remuneration in case of non-representative directors, could be allowed ex post either by 
resolution of the board of directors if more than three percent of shareholders did not object 
or by special resolution of shareholder meeting (Corporate Law Sections 425; 426; 427).  18
dividends and to repurchase shares at shareholder meetings,24 while this practice is 
impossible in the United States. This legal system gives shareholders stronger 
bargaining power to push management to take more risk.     
 
Both in Japan and in the United States, tax law, which let companies deduct 
interest payment from their profit, lead management to take more risk. Bankruptcy 
laws, which favor the debtor in possession25 and private reorganizations,26  also lead 
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I will argue, in the next subsection, that SOX and J-SOX, contrary to the 
original plan of the lawmakers,27  may lead management to take less risk.   
                                                  
24  Corporate Law Sections 454; 156. The company can, however, let its board of directors 
decide dividend and repurchase of shares by changing its article of incorporations 
(Corporate Law Section 459 Subsection 1). The company needs another change of its article 
of incorporation for precluding those matters from shareholder proposal (Corporate Law 
Section 460). 
25  Private Rehabilitation Law Section 38 Subsection 1. 
26  There are two competing schemes of private reorganizations in Japan, one is the 
Guideline of Private Reorganization (2001), and another is the Business Rehabilitation ADR, 
which is based on the Industries Vitality Stimulating Law Reformation of 2007. They 
contribute to increase the transparency of private reorganization procedure and, as a result, 
encourage the practice. 
27  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), enacted in response to major corporate and 
accounting scandals including those involving Enron and WorldCom, is said to be the most  19
 
C. Spillover Effects of SOX and Interrelationships Enforcement Laws and Substantial 
Laws 
 
SOX and J-SOX play an interesting role, which lawmakers probably never 
expected, in interactions among different bargaining relationships. 
 
1. Impacts on Management and Shareholders Relationship 
 
The major beneficiary of SOX and J-SOX, as an original intent of the 
legislatures, must be shareholders and potential shareholders, i.e., investors. They can 
demand that management provide better disclosure and better governance because of 
SOX and J-SOX. In this meaning, SOX and J-SOX give shareholders additional 
bargaining power against management and decrease shareholders’ risk in investment. 
 
Shareholders will, however, bear costs of implementation and maintenance of 
the internal control system required by SOX and J-SOX, even though they may benefit 
from the system. The problems are what methods can be used to balance the costs and 
benefits of internal control, and in this regard, how shareholders, particularly 
institutional shareholders, as the cost-bearers perceive this problem and how 
implementation guidelines would work. 
                                                                                                                                                  
important regulatory reform in the 70 plus-year history of U.S. federal regulation of 
securities transactions, and has already been widely evaluated from a legal perspective. 
Japan learned from the U.S. and, effective the fiscal year commencing April 1, 2008, 
implemented the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, known as J-SOX for its 
similarity to SOX, requiring public companies to report on internal control.  The United 
States, after six years of regulatory experience since implementing SOX, is currently 
discussing possible amendments to the law, while Japan has just entered its first year under 
J-SOX. 
In the U.S., the most controversial provision of SOX, Section 302, requires that the 
chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) of each public company attest 
to the effectiveness of internal control and the adequacy of financial statements. 
Furthermore, Section 404 provides that the company's management assess the effectiveness 
of internal controls over financial reporting and that the external auditor attest to and 
report on that assessment. Any "significant deficiencies" must be reported by the company's 
management and an independent auditor. The inclusion of this requirement in the law 
points to congressional concern that under the then-existing rules there was a reasonable 
possibility for a material misstatement in financial statements to not be prevented on a 
timely basis. Responding to criticism over substantial increases in compliance costs 
associated with the reporting requirements, the regulatory authorities have adopted new 




Serious questions were raised not only concerning their cost problem, but also 
about their benefit to shareholders. Many believe that increasingly abundant and 
precise information disclosure and its resulting greater transparency are always 
desirable. According to Professors Hermalin and Weisbach, however, this is not 
necessarily the case from the perspective of good governance. With respect to ex post 
evaluation, CEOs inevitably become taking less risk, both from the viewpoint of 
retaining their current positions and in view of their desire to improve their reputation 
amid today's job-hopping market. Disclosure of more precise information increases the 
likelihood for the ex ante evaluation of a CEO to be changed to ex post. Therefore, 
higher-quality information increases the expected payoff to shareholders but decreases 
the payoff to the CEO. The CEO in turn demands higher compensation. That, however, 
is not the only outcome of requiring the CEO to provide more precise information. The 
demand for greater disclosure provides the CEO with the incentive to manipulate 
information. External efforts to enhance information disclosure can be harmful and 
reduce social welfare. Companies disclose information to differing extents, which means 
they are selecting their optimal level of disclosure in accordance with the conditions 
they face.28 
 
2. Impacts on Management and Creditors Relationship 
 
Actually, the real beneficiaries of SOX and J-SOX seem to be creditors. Of 
course, from the beginning, shareholder protection was not the sole purpose of SOX. The 
legislation has multiple aspects and was devised to enhance the transparency and 
accountability of listed companies as public entities.29    Therefore, it was expected that, 
beside shareholders, creditors will also benefit from better disclosure and better 
governance system. 
 
SOX provides an unexpected benefit, a kind of windfall for creditors, which 
raise the fundamental corporate governance point of the conflicting interests between 
shareholders and creditors on risk taking. Because of SOX, management is more likely 
to be pushed towards the less risky business judgment30.  
                                                  
28  Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Weisbach, Information Disclosure and Corporate 
Governance (Working Paper 2008). 
29  See Donald Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
1817 (2007).   
30  See Kate Litvak, Defensive Management: Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Discourage  21
 
When disagreements arise over the adequacy of internal control, the company's 
management and independent auditor then negotiate, which places excessive costs on 
management because the auditors' bargaining power is substantially strengthened by, 
among other things, the presence of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), a new regulatory organ. This prospect causes corporate managers to adopt 
more less risky behavior.31 As a result, creditors will benefit at the expense of 
shareholders. 
 
We will call such an unexpected effect of a legal system the “spill-over effect.”32 
 
3. Characteristics of Its Enforcement 
 
From the legislation history point of view, both SOX and J-SOX were not 
demand pull reforms, but typical policy push reforms. In other words, they were not 
initiated by the business sectors, but initiated by the legislature in a broad sense to 
change business practices.33 Although, generally speaking, policy push reforms which 
influenced practice are relatively rare,34  SOX and J-SOX are obviously having a serious 
influence on practice, owing to the special characteristics of their enforcement 
mechanisms. 
 
First, unlike many corporate governance regulations which are based on 
private enforcement, the enforcement of SOX and J-SOX is based on public enforcement. 
Management is monitored by governmental agencies and management will be 
prosecuted if she breaches her duty. Therefore, the enforcement mechanism is very 
strong and management is not allowed to balance the costs and benefits of the internal 
                                                                                                                                                  
Corporate Risk-Taking? (Working Paper 2008); Qiang Kang & Quiao Liu, The Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act and Managerial Risk Taking: A Structural Assessment (Working Paper 2007); 
Leonce Bergeron, Kenneth Lehn & Chad Zutter, Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-Taking 
(Working Paper 2007). 
31  See Langevoort, supra note 29, at 1824. 
32  We can observe another spill-over effect on the employees-management bargaining 
relationship, too. Management is actually another unexpected beneficiary of SOX. With SOX 
or not, management always has an incentive to collect information from employees and 
make sure her orders are followed by all employees. Employees have, however, an incentive 
not to disclose their information to their boss because they would like to keep their 
autonomy. Now, management gains special bargaining power over employees because of 
SOX. Management can order employees to report precisely, because it is the law. 
33  See Shishido, supra note 10, at 656. 
34  See id. at 673.  22
control system.35 
 
Second, while many governmental regulations, such as tax and industry 
regulations, usually address the corporation itself, SOX and J-SOX directly address 
management and external auditors. While most governmental regulations indirectly 
influence management’s incentive, SOX and J-SOX directly influence the incentive of 









V. Shareholder Activism: Complementarities among Different Laws 
 
Shareholder activism is a new trend in Japanese corporate governance since 
2005. We can find that here, the legal system plays an important role. Some laws 
stimulate shareholder activism and other laws discourage it. We can observe 
                                                  
35  The cost bearers of such a mechanism are shareholders. Although the corporation is a 
private business organization, whose purpose is maximizing shareholder value, 
shareholders cannot demand management to balance costs and benefits to maximizing 
shareholder interests. 
36  Even though tax and most governmental regulations address the corporation, instead of 
directly addressing management, these regulations cannot be neutral to the incentive 
bargain among the four players. The structure of SOX and J-SOX risks changing the status 
quo of the bargaining relationship among the four players too much.  23
complementarities among different laws for both directions. 
 
A. Complementarities among Laws which Stimulate Shareholder Activism 
 
Japanese corporate law gives the shareholder meeting wider decision making 
power than state corporate laws in the United States do.37 The wider decision making 
power of the shareholder meeting by itself will not stimulate shareholder activism so 
much, but with the minority shareholder right of proposal38 and the proxy voting 
system,39  it will be substantially influential. 
 
In order to be fully effective, the minority shareholder right of proposal and the 
proxy voting system must be supported by minority information rights, such as the 
right to see accounting documents40  and the right to elect inspectors.41  
 
Such minority information rights are also complementary to the shareholder 
derivative action. Japanese minority information rights are, however, generally 
recognized as not sufficient for supporting shareholder activism either with 
shareholders derivative actions or with the right of proposal and the proxy voting. 
Japanese courts have restrictively interpreted the right to see accounting documents,42 
requiring that shareholders specify the documents, although shareholders are generally 
unaware of the existence of specific documents.43 The right to elect inspectors is 
organized in too neutral a manner to incentivize shareholders’ exercise of the right. 
 
However, a small reformation of the shareholder derivative action in 2005, 
which requires the company to notify the plaintiff shareholders the reason why it will 
not sue the defendant directors,44  is expected to stimulate shareholder activism. 
                                                  
37  In Japan, shareholder meeting decides more than what American shareholder meeting 
does, such as dividend, repurchase of shares, and directors’ salary.   
38  Corporate Law Sections 303; 304; 305. In Japan, shareholders can propose amendments 
of article of incorporation without proposal by the board of directors, while it is impossible in 
the United States.   
39  In Japan, shareholders of listed companies must be offered the opportunity to vote either 
by proxy or by letter. Corporate Law Section 298 Subsection 2. 
40  Corporate Law Section 433 Subsection 1. 
41  Corporate Law Section 358 Subsection 1. 
42  See In re Koito Manufacturing, 1315 HANREI JIHO 3 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., June 22, 1989); 1397 
HANREI JIHO 114 (Yokohama Dist. Ct., Apr. 19, 1991).   
43  See 27-1 KOMINSHU 34 (Sendai High Ct., Feb. 18, 1974); 1221 HANREI JIHO 126 
(Takamatsu high Ct., September 29, 1986). 
44  Corporate Law Section 847 Subsection 4.  24
 
B. Complementarities among Laws which Discourage Shareholder Activism 
 
The United States and Japan share the same type of so-called five percent  
rule,45  which requires that a purchaser of shares in a publicly held corporation identify 
itself and disclose certain information within certain period after it acquires five 
percent or more of the corporation’s shares, even if it plans no further purchases. This 
five percent rule was implemented as an early warning system, in order to prevent the 
so-called “Saturday night special” and to promote auctions and increase takeover 
premiums.46 
 
The five percent rule, however, has the practical effect of discouraging 
shareholder activism.47  The reporting obligations for joint ownership48 will  weaken  the 
incentive of institutional investors to solicit other institutional investors against voting. 
The disclosure obligation of the object to hold shares49 will discourage institutional 
investors from making informal proposals to management.50 
 
Incomplete information rights also discourage shareholder activism. The lack 
of discovery in Japan will discourage the use of injunctions against management 
activities51 [See  Figure  12].  
                                                  
45  Financial Instruments and Exchange Law Sections 27-23 ~ 27-30. 
46  See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 193 
(10th ed, 2007). 
47  Until 1992, in the United States, the proxy solicitation rule and the five percent rule 
(Rule 13D) had complementarily discouraged shareholder activism. American law makers, 
however, reformed the proxy solicitation rule in 1992 and in 1999, and the five percent rule 
in 1998 for getting rid of such negative effect to shareholder activism. See Thomas W. Briggs, 
Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical analysis, Summer 
2007 J. CORP. L. 681, 686-694. 
48  Financial Instruments and Exchange Law Section 27-3 Subsection 5. 
49  Financial Instruments and Exchange Law Section 27-3 Subsection 1. 
50  See Sadakazu Osaki, Tairyo Hoyu Houkoku-seido no Haseikoka to Kinofuzen (Spillover 
Effects and Malfunction of the Large Stockholding Report Regulation) (Discussion Paper for 
RIETI Panel Discussion, Feb. 5, 2009). 
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VI. Alliance against Genuine Shareholders: Multi-Relational Interrelationships 
 
After the control market was created and the trend of shareholder activism has 
emerged since 2005, Japanese management started to recreate cross-shareholding, 
which had been decreasing during the 1990s. At the same time, the coalition between 
management and core-employees, which had appeared to loosen during the 1990s, 
began to tighten again. We can observe the “cross-holding” shareholders alliance 
against genuine shareholders as the fourth incentive pattern, in other words, the 
interrelationship between the creditor-management bargaining relationship and the 
employee-management bargaining relationship. Several legal systems, including case 
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A. Coalition between Cross-holding Shareholders and Management 
 
Cross-holding shareholders can be divided to three categories: banks, business 
creditors, and business shareholders. Trading partners of the firm in the Japanese 
business system have multi-dimensional characteristics. They are usually either 
creditors or debtors. Trading partners provide important human capital to each other. 
In many cases, trading partners cross-hold each other’s shares as a symbol of long-term 
trading relationships. 
 
Such a practice can be economically supported from two points of view. First is 
the hostage theory. Trading partners exchange “hostages,” i.e., a certain block of shares, 
with each other, which is intended to prevent each partner from engaging in 
opportunistic behavior to the detriment of the other.52  Second is the monitoring theory. 
A trading partner, as a factor provider, has an incentive to monitor the management of 
its partner for survival in the product market, and it also has good information to 
                                                  
52  See Motoshige Itoh, Kigyokan Kankei to Keizokuteki Torihiki [Inter-Firm Relationships 
and Relational Transactions],in JAPANESE ENTERPRISES 109 (KENICHI IMAI & RYUTARO 
KOMIYA EDS., 1989); David Flath, Shareholding in the Keiretsu: Japan’s Financial Groups, 
75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 249 (1993)  27
monitor. Therefore, it is advisable to let trading partners hold a block of shares and 
exercise their voice, backed up by voting rights.53 
 
The recent trend of cross-shareholding since 2005 is, however, designed to 
organize defense alliance among nominal trading partners. The unwinding of 
cross-shareholding from 1998 to 2004 was mainly caused by banks’ investment behavior, 
but the revival of cross-shareholding in recent years is among non-bank business 
corporations.54 
 
Because cross-shareholding among trading partners could be supported for 
several reasons, as previously discussed, it is hard to prove that organizing a 
cross-shareholding is a violation of management’s fiduciary duty, if management insists 
that it was motivated by a good business reason. In other words, the business judgment 
rule strongly protects management’s discretionary authority to organize defense 
cross-shareholdings. 
 
The Supreme Court decision in the Bulldog Sauce case in 2007 also encouraged 
management to organize defensive cross-shareholdings. The Supreme Court held that 
the exercise of the poison pill by Bulldog Sauce was legal because it had been supported 
by majority shareholders.55  
 
The Bulldog Sauce case and the business judgment rule complementarily give 
management the incentive to recreate cross-shareholdings for defensive purposes, even 
providing incentives to create inefficient business alliances. 
 
The ambiguity of Japanese case law on defensive measures against hostile 
takeovers, so-called poison pills, also encourages management to create defensive 
cross-shareholdings. A statistical study shows that firms with poison pill defenses also 
tend to organize more cross-shareholdings.56  This suggests that cross-shareholdings 
                                                  
53  See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps 
between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L. J. 871 (1993). See 
also Hideaki Miyajima & Fumiaki Kuroki, The Unwinding of Cross-shareholding in Japan: 
Causes, Effects, and Implications (Working Paper 2006), which statistically shows that 
block shareholding by corporations have positive effects on firm performance. 
54  See Keisuke Nitta, Corporate Ownership Structure in Japan: Recent Trends and Their 
Impact (NLI Research, 2008).   
55  Steel Partners v. Bulldog Sauce, 61-5 MINSHU 221 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 7,2007). 
56  See Miho Takizawa, Kotaro Tsuru & Kaoru Hosono, Baishu Boeisaku Donyu no Doki: 
Keiei Hoshin Kasetsu no Kensho [Takeover Defense Measures: Testing of Entrenchment  28
and poison pills are not substitutive but complementary, which indicates the 
entrenchment of management. 
 
Such a recent revival of cross-shareholding does not look favorable because it 
distorts the incentive of genuine shareholders to invest. The question is which legal 
systems can be effective for discouraging the creation of defensive cross-shareholding. 
 
The first possibility is to change the accounting rule on cross-holding stocks. 
Actually, the accounting rule was already changed. Cross-holding stocks used to be 
booked on their purchased value. Therefore, management did not need to worry about 
the performance of cross-holding stocks. Since the fiscal year of April 2001, 
cross-holding stocks must be booked at market price.57 Management will be criticized 
by genuine shareholders if they suffer capital losses. It would be hard for management 
to keep holding bad performance cross-holding stocks. The effect of the change is, 
however, unknown. Although ownership of corporate shares by financial institutions 
dropped significantly after the banking crisis of 1997, cross-shareholding between 
corporations decreased only slightly58. Cross-shareholding has even re-increased among 
some companies since 2005, the year of opening Japanese control market. The benefit of 
cross-shareholding to management of the companies with high risk of take over must be 
larger than the risk of bad reputation by the stock market. 
 
The second possibility is to implement the Revlon rule, which require the board 
of directors to be an auctioneer in case of a change of control.59 The significance of the 
Revlon rule is to guarantee shareholders the right to exit at the highest price in the 
battle for control. It would be possible to argue that the Revlon rule cannot be waived by 
majority vote because it is the right of individual shareholders.60 Currently, Japanese 
management can get rid of raiders as long as she obtains support from the majority of 
                                                                                                                                                  
Hypothesis for Corporate Managers] (RIETI Discussion Paper, 2007). 
57  See Enterprise Accounting Committee, Financial Instruments Accounting Guideline of 
1999. 
58  The selection of shares, which banks sold after the banking crisis, not only undermined 
corporate governance but also led the degrading of their own portfolio because they sold 
shares with higher liquidity and higher expected rates of return, while holding shares of 
firms with which they had long-term relationships. See Miyajima & Kuroki, supra note 53. 
59  Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. Supr. 1085). See 
WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 204 (10th 
ed, 2007). 
60  If we can understand the intent of the Revlon rule as guaranteeing minority shareholders 
the right of exit at the highest possible price, such a right should not be changed by the 
majority rule.  29
shareholders. This takeover defense would not be guaranteed under the non-waivable 
Revlon rule.   
 
The third possibility is the reinterpretation of the statute which prohibits 
giving benefit for the exercise of shareholder rights.61 Although the statute was 
originally made to prohibit management from giving bribes to professional shareholders, 
Professor Takahito Kato proposes to utilize it for aligning the incentive structure of 
shareholders.62   
 
As we discussed, a variety of legal systems, including case laws, such as 
Bulldog Sauce case, as well as the lack of laws, such as the absence of the Revlon rule, 
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B. Coalition between Employees and Management 
 
                                                  
61  Corporate Law Section 120. 
62  See Takahito Kato, Riekikyoyo Kinshi Kitei to Kabushiki Mochiai: Kabunushi no 
Insenthibu Kozo no Kantenkara [The Statute of Prohibiting Giving Benefit for the Exercise 
of Shareholder Rights: From the Perspective of Shareholder Incentive Mechanism] 
(Discussion Paper for RIETI Panel Discussion, Feb. 5, 2009).  30
While the coalition between employees and management is famously known as 
the “company community” in the Japanese business system,63 here we will argue it 
functions as a part of the alliance against genuine shareholders. In a sense, it is natural 
for management and employees to create a coalition against genuine shareholders 
because they share the same interest in their role as human capital providers, i.e., to 
keep autonomy against monetary capital providers, particularly genuine shareholders. 
Additionally, unique Japanese practices, markets, and laws interrelationally support 
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1. Enterprise Unions 
 
Union practice is unique in Japan, in comparison with both the United States 
and Europe. While, in United States and in EU countries, labor unions are industry 
unions, Japanese labor unions are basically enterprise unions.64 It is much easier to 
create a coalition between employees and management with enterprise unions than 
with industry unions. Particularly in cases of hostile takeovers, Japanese enterprise 
                                                  
63  See Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of 
Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 201 (2000). 
64  See Nobuhiro Hiwatari, Employment Practice and Enterprise Unionism in Japan, in 
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 275 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 
1999).  31
unions always declare their support for incumbent management and against the 
raider.65 
 
2. Labor Markets 
 
Japanese labor markets are unique in two ways. First is the lack, or 
incompleteness, of external labor markets for core employees and for management. 
Second is the combination of internal labor markets for core employees and for 
management. In other words, the turnover rate of core employees is small and 
management is mostly chosen among core employees as in-house promotion. As a result, 
incumbent management and core employees share the same identity and both of them 
invest their energies in maintaining good reputations within the firm. It is also 
understandable for them to try to prevent the raider’s intervention in order to save their 
sunk costs. 
 
3. Labor Laws 
 
Finally, unique Japanese labor law affects the incentive of the players of the 
incentive bargain of the firm,66  and plays the role of shark repellent.   
 
The rule of dismissal is very different in the United States and in Japan. In the 
United States, management basically can discharge employees without cause (the 
employment at will rule).67  In Japan, management cannot discharge employees without 
good cause, which has been strictly interpreted by courts (the abusive dismissal 
doctrine).68 
 
Such a case law was originally created to protect employees and as a result 
ratified the practice of so called lifetime employment.69  In fact, the case law doctrine of 
abusive dismissal does not only strengthen employees’ bargaining power against 
                                                  
65  See e.g., NIKKEI, Aug. 3, 2006, at 3 (Hokuetsu Paper Case). 
66  See Takashi Toichi & Yuki Tanaka, Kaikoken Ranyo Hori no Insenthibu Koka to Hasei 
Koka [Incentive Effects and Spillover Effects of the Abusive Dismissal Doctrine] (Discussion 
Paper for RIETI Panel Discussion, Feb. 5, 2009). 
67  See J. H. Verkerke, The Law and Economics of Employment Protection (Discussion Paper 
for RIETI Panel Discussion, July 15, 2008). 
68  See Ryuichi Yamakawa, Changing Aspects of Japanese Dismissal Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: 
A TURNING POINT 483 (Daniel H. Foote, ed., 2007). 
69  The case law doctrine became statutory law in 2004. See Labor Contract Law Section 16.  32
management, but also strengthens management’s bargaining power against 
shareholders.70   
 
Management owes a fiduciary duty to shareholders both in the United States 
and Japan.71 Shareholders can demand management to run the firm for maximizing 
their interest. When decreasing the labor force will increase the firm’s profitability, 
shareholders will likely insist upon layoffs and management will be forced to lay off 
employees because of her fiduciary duty to shareholders. Japanese management has 
greater bargaining power against shareholders, because she can respond to 
shareholders’ demands that even though she owes the fiduciary duty to shareholders, 
she has to comply with the labor law rule against abusive dismissal. However, American 
management cannot make such statements to shareholders, and therefore has weaker 
bargaining power against shareholders’ demands. Japanese management is legally 
allowed to balance the interest of shareholders and the interest of employees, at least in 
the case of dismissal.  The labor law rule of abusive dismissal and the corporate law 
rule of fiduciary duty interrelationally affect the interaction between different 
bargaining relationships.   
 
The abusive dismissal doctrine does not only strengthen the management’s 
bargaining power against shareholders, but also makes the existence of full-time 
employees72 a shark repellent because even a new management could not discharge 
surplus labor easily.73 
 
Besides the abusive dismissal doctrine, other Japanese labor law rules have 
similar shark repellent effects. It will be very hard for management to change the salary 
system unfavorably for employees,74 and make employees work overtime,75 if labor 
                                                  
70  See Toru Kitagawa, Torishimariyaku no Chujitsugimu nikansuru Ichi-kosatsu: Kaikoken 
Ranyo Hori to Sutehkuhorudah Riron [A View of Directors’ Fiduciary Duty: The Abusive 
Dismissal Doctrine and the Stakeholder Doctrine], 30 SEIKEI DAIGAKU HOGAKU SEIJIGAKU 
KENKYU 1 (2004). 
71  Although Japanese corporate law only refers directors’ fiduciary duty to the company 
(Corporate Law Section 355), the overwhelming view considers the interest of the company 
is the economic interest of shareholders. See Egashira, supra note 19, at 395. 
72  Strong protection of employment and wage by Japanese labor law gives Japanese 
management incentive to distinguish full-time employees and part-time employees who are 
not protected by the abusive dismissal doctrine for adjusting work force to business cycle. 
73  See Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, Managers, Workers, and Corporate Governance, 60 J. 
FIN. 841 (2005). 
74  See Labor Union Law Section 16; In re Asahi Fire Marine Insurance, 713 ROHAN 27 (Sup. 
Ct., Mar. 27, 1997); In re Daiyon Bank, 51-2 MINSHU 705 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 28, 1997).   33





To write the structure of the enterprise law is to write the structure of the 
enterprise, particularly, the structure of the incentive bargain among the four different 
types of capital providers to the enterprise. The enterprise law does not have 
significance by itself, but has significance when it works as an infrastructural element 
for the incentive bargain of the firm. Each part of the enterprise law will seldom affect 
the incentive bargain independently, but it will, in many cases, affect the incentive 
bargain interrelationally with other parts of the enterprise law, contracts, and markets. 
 
While the law is relevant to business practice, it is not the same as business 
practice. Laws often affect business practice by influencing the incentive of players 
within the incentive bargain. Lawmakers, however, often seek to draft “good” textual 
law, without ever considering the incentives of the players or the interrelationships that 
law shares with other infrastructural elements of the firm’s incentive bargain. Some 
laws may have no effect on the practice at all because they do not affect any player’s 
incentive. Other laws, however, may cause unexpected changes in business practice 
because of their spillover effects. 
 
Law makers should take the following five points into consideration when they 
attempt to change the current enterprise law: first, how the new law will affect the 
incentives of the four capital providers of the firm, particularly, the possibility of giving 
some players perverse incentive; second, how the new law will work interrelationally 
with contracts and markets; third, how the new law will work interrelationally with 
existing laws, including enforcement systems; fourth, whether there are any spillover 
effects or malfunctions in the current enterprise law; and finally, how to keep a good 
balance between autonomy and monitoring of management. Then law makers can 
contribute to achieve an efficient incentive bargain of the firm and to stimulate the 




                                                                                                                                                  
75  See Labor Standard Law Section 36. 